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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sanja Rose, AK.A Tucakovic, appeals from the district court's denial of her
post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting the trafficking
of heroin.

On appeal she asserts that her alleged belief that she could avoid the

mandatory minimum sentence by pleading guilty demonstrates manifest injustice.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Rose on a charge of aiding and abetting the trafficking of
heroin.

(R., pp.6-7.)

The case was consolidated with another case that charged

possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.11; 4/5/2013 Tr., p.6, Ls.9-13.) Ultimately,
Rose pleaded guilty to the trafficking charge in exchange for the state limiting its
sentencing recommendation to eight years with the mandatory minimum three years
fixed, and dismissing the possession charge. (R., pp.48-55; 4/5/2013 Tr., p.5, L.12 p.6, L.13.) In taking Rose's guilty plea, the district court ensured that she understood
that the court was required to impose a minimum fixed term of three years for the crime.
(4/5/2013 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, L.6.) Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the district
court entered a judgment of conviction against Rose and sentenced her to a unified
term of seven years with the mandatory minimum of three years fixed. (R., pp.63-66.)
Rose filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.74-75.)
Thereafter, Rose filed a motion to set aside her guilty plea, asserting that her
plea was involuntary because she believed she could avoid the mandatory minimum
sentence. (R., pp.84-87.) The district court held a hearing on the motion (R., pp.96-98;
1/17/2014 Tr.), and invited the parties to submit written closing arguments and left open
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the option for oral presentations (1/17/2014 Tr., p.77, L.10 - p.78, L.18). The parties
submitted the written closing arguments (R., pp.105-31) and later presented oral
arguments to the district court (See 5/2/2014 Tr.). After reviewing all of these materials,
the district court denied Rose's motion to withdraw her guilty plea because she failed to
show manifest injustice. (Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant's Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea (Augmentation), hereinafter "Order.")
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ISSUE
Rose states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Rose's
motion to withdraw her plea?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Rose failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying
her post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
Rose Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Her
Post-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
Introduction

A.

Rose contends that the district court erred by denying her post-sentencing
motion to withdraw her guilty plea to aiding and abetting the trafficking of heroin.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.)

The district court, finding that Rose was attempting to

withdraw her guilty plea because she was dissatisfied with her sentence and that Rose
had failed to show manifest injustice, denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
(Order.)

On appeal, Rose asserts that she showed manifest injustice because she

asserted that her attorney said there was a chance she could avoid the mandatory
minimum sentence of three years for aiding and abetting the trafficking of heroin.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this
case, however, demonstrates that she has failed to satisfy her burden of showing
manifest injustice or an abuse of discretion by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining whether the district court exercised

sound judicial discretion, as

distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 51, 53
(1993).

On appeal from the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty

plea, the appellate court examines the entire record to determine whether it is
manifestly unjust to preclude the defendant from withdrawing his guilty plea. State v.
Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993).
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C.

Rose Has Failed To Show Manifest Injustice
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after

sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281,284 (1990); Hoover
v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court may permit a
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing only upon a satisfactory showing
by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is necessary to correct a "manifest
injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). The strictness of the standard is justified by the legal weight of
the guilty plea: "A plea of guilty has the same force and effect as a judgment rendered
after a full trial on the merits." Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802
(Ct. App. 1982). Especially relevant to this case, the stricter standard also ensures that
the defendant is not "encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential
punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v.
Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009).
Applying these correct legal standards to Rose's motion, which was based on her
unrealized aspirations of a more lenient sentence, the district court correctly denied the
motion. (Order, Augmentation.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the
district court's analysis contained within its "Memorandum and Order Concerning
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea," a copy of which is attached hereto as
"Appendix A."
On appeal, Rose asserts that her guilty plea was involuntary because, she
claims, her attorney said he would try for a "Hail Mary" and creatively argue that, in spite
of the mandatory minimum, the district court could consider probation.
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(Appellant's

brief, pp.3, 6-9.) Regardless of what her attorney's advice may have been, 1 Rose was
directly and in the clearest terms informed by the district court on multiple occasions
prior to pronouncing sentence that her crime carried with it a mandatory minimum fixed
term of at least three years.

(See 4/5/2013 Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.6; 8/2/2013 Tr.,

p.43, L.12 - p.45, L.2.) The district court also explained that a fixed term meant she
would be required to serve the time without the possibility of parole. (4/5/2013 Tr., p.15,
Ls.12-16.) Even if there had been no legal impediment to placing Rose on probation,
when the district court informed Rose that she would be sentenced to at least a fixed
term of three years, that removed any reasonable expectation of a more lenient
sentence. Rose's wholly unreasonable aspiration to be placed on probation does not
make her guilty plea involuntary.
The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea should be withdrawn.
Stone, 147 Idaho at 333, 208 P.3d at 737; State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178, 857
P .2d 656, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). Rose failed to satisfy that burden.

Rose's failure to

receive the sentence she hoped for does not demonstrate manifest injustice.

The

district court correctly denied her post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea and
should be affirmed.

Contradicting Rose's assertions, her attorney testified during the hearing on her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea that he had explained to her, as clearly as he could
and many times, that the court would be required to impose a mandatory minimum fixed
term of three years of imprisonment. (1/17/2014 Tr., p.56, L.21 - p.57, L.2; p.57, Ls.1521; p.62, L.1 - p.63, L.12; p.67, L.19 - p.68, L.7; p.69, L.5 - p.70, L.18.)
6

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Rose's post-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

DATED this 17th day of December, 2014.

c~

RlJS.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of December, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ,JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF

THE ST.ATE Of IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,
PL.--\INTIFF,
\'.

SAN,J.\ ROSE,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-FE-20012-0012226
.'l'lEl\lORANDlJlVI AND ORDER
CONCERNING f)g FENDANT'S
;\[O'I'ION TO \NITHDRA W
GUILTY PLEA

)
)
)
)

_______________)

Defondnnt Sanja Rose has moved pursuant to ICR 33(c) to withdraw her guilty
plua to one count of trafficking in heroin in an amount of two grams or more hut less

than Sl!Ven grnms. I.C. Se>dion :37-27;32B(n)O)(.-\). By statute the crime requires a

mandatory imposition of a minimum fixed thn'<i-ycar term of impt·isonment and a
mandatory minimum fine of $10,000.00. The maximum sentence can be life and the
rnaxinrnrn fine $100,000.00. [•'ollowing lwr guilty plen. the defendant l'l'ceived a
sc•ntence of :-:uvtm ,\'l'at'S with the fil'st threP

.H'IH'S

fixed and a fine of $10,000.00. Since

the defendant's mot ion was fihld afror sentencing, she must show "manifest injustice"
hd'orP lwr pfr 11 may be ,vithdrnwn. 1CR 3:1({'.).
1

lf a p k•a i;,,1 not taken i.n compliance wi ! h tho c.:onstitutional d uc
l hat

IH'OCL'!-<S

standard

it lw mado volunra1·ily, knowingly, and intellig-~}ntly, then manifoJst inju:-:t.iee hns
i

;

1. .
i:

MAY O7 2014

)

)

been shown. A constitutional due process violation, however, is not necessarily
required to show manifest injustice. The burden is on the defendant to show a
justification for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Finally, manifest injustice must be shown
before a post-sentencing motion may be granted in order to insure that a defendant is
not entering a guilty plea to test the weight of potential punishment and then seeking
to withdraw a guilty plea if the sentence is more severe than expected. State v. Stone,
147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2009, review denied 2009).
An evidentiaiy hearing took place on January 17, 2014, before Judge Hansen.
The only testifying witnesses were the defendant and her former attorney, Mr. Bret
Fox. Final oral argument was scheduled for May 2, 2014, but Judge Hansen was ill on
that date. I was asked to hear closing argument and to render a decision. Prior to
making my decision, I took the matter under advisement, reviewed the briefs and
exhibits, and listened to the tape-recorded transcript of the entire evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Rose contends that her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered, specifically because she was not aware that a judgment of
conviction for trafficking in heroin carried with it a mandatory three-year minimum
fixed sentence. Instead she believed she would be placed on probation, placed in drug
court, or at worst placed in the retained jurisdiction program.
At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Rose testified in summary fashion that her
attorney told her that she might get probation or a retained jurisdiction.
The state introduced transcripts of arraignment and plea hearings at which Ms.
MEMORANDUM AMO ORDER
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)

)

Rose was advised by various judges on numerous occasions that the trafficking charge
against her carried with it a mandatory minimum sentence of three years fixed and
that the sentence could be extended to life. No judge or anyone else in court ever
suggested to her that she would

receive probation, drug court, or a retained

jurisdiction.
Mr. Fox testified that he tried without success to get the prosecutor to reduce the
charge to a crime that did not have a mandatory minimum. He was only able to obtain
dismissal of other drug-delivery felonies and a recommendation of a sentence of three
years fixed and five years indete1·minate. He told Ms. Rose in no uncertain terms that
the chance of getting probation, drug court, or a retained jurisdiction was virtually nil.
Nevertheless, he did tell her that he would try a "Hail Mary., type of argument to
convince the judge that Ms. Rose should receive something other than the fixed
mandatory minimum. At the sentencing hearing Mr. Fox argued strenuously but
unavailingly against imposition of a fixed minimum sentence. Judge Hansen imposed a
sentence of three years fixed and four years indeterminate.
After reviewing the evidence, it is patent that Ms. Rose's claim that she did not
know that she would receive a fixed minimum sentence of at least three years flies in
the face ofreality. The probative and believable evidence demonstrates that her guilty
plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. There was no due process
violation. In addition there are no other facts that suggest that her plea should be
withdrawn to "correct manifest injustice."
MEMORANDUM AMO ORDER
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)

)

There has been no showing of manifest injustice. The defendant's motion will be
denied, and the guilty plea will stand.
The foregoing memornndum constitutes the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

MEMORANDUM AMO ORDER
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ORDER
It hereby i.s ordered t lrnt the motion of Snnja Rose to w:ithclra\V her guilty plea is
denied, the defondnnt ro obtain no relief thereby.

May 5. 2014
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